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0. Introduction
Received wisdom holds that questions, themselves lacking truth conditions,
should be analyzed in terms of the propositions that count as answering the
question. The literature on interrogatives often focuses on informative and polar
questions which ask for a specific piece of information or a yes-no answer respec-
tively (see for example Hamblin 1958, 1973; Karttunen 1977; Groenendijk and
Stokhof 1982, 1984). These accounts more or less agree that a question denotes
its true and complete answer, either as a partition of logical space (Groenendijk
and Stokhof 1984), or as a set of propositions (Karttunen 1977).
In this paper I am concerned with a different kind of question, the class of 
open questions, like the ones in (1a) – (d). 
(1) a. How do you feel?
b. What is Chicago like?
c. What do you make of Paris Hilton?
d. What is the effect of the stimulus plan on the economy?
Open questions display a number of properties that are different from other 
question types that make a formal analysis along the lines of the traditional 
accounts difficult. As Groenendijk and Stokhof (1997) have also noted, open 
questions do not seem to fit the picture drawn by various accounts of interroga-
tives, as answering an open question appears to be a creative process, where the 
answers are not pre-set, or exhaustive. They further note that it often does not 
make sense to qualify them as ‘true’ or ‘false’ but rather ‘good,’ ‘helpful,’ and so 
on (p. 55-56). To illustrate the difference between open and informative questions 
consider the two questions in (2). While (1a) is an informative question seeking a 
particular piece of information, (2b) very intuitively asks for an opinion, or a 
comment of some sort. Crucially, the answer is relative to the speaker, and there 
is no obvious sense in which an answer to such a question can be exhaustive.  
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(2)  a. Who lives in Chicago? 
 b. What is living in Chicago like? 
 
 My goals in this paper are three-fold. First, I will show that the semantic 
analyses of interrogatives available do not account for data from open questions. 
In particular, I will be concerned with the observation that unlike informative 
questions, answers to open questions are agent-relative and non-exhaustive, and 
that the propositions in the answer space are non-mutually exclusive.  Second, I 
propose an account of open questions using insights from modal semantics 
(Kratzer 1977, 1981), which builds directly on Karttunen’s (1977) analysis and 
maintains the intuition that questions denote their true and complete answer. 
Finally, I show that this account is easily extendable to other problematic and 
unproblematic question types, moving toward a unified theory of questions. The 
proposed analysis has at its core the intuition that open questions merit a semantic 
analysis in their own right, one that incorporates concepts from pragmatics and 
discourse, rather than marginalizing the semantics for problematic cases by 
appealing to various extra-semantic components.  
 I will proceed as follows: Section 1 presents some background on the seman-
tics of interrogatives. In section 2 I review the crucial data from open questions 
that seem to defy the conclusions of previous analyses. A formal framework and 
its extensions are laid out in section 3. Section 4 concludes.  
 
1. Background on the Semantics of Interrogatives 
Semantic accounts of interrogatives fall into two main camps: those that view 
questions as denoting sets of propositions and those that hold that questions 
denote a singe proposition corresponding to a partition of logical space.  
 
1.1.   Questions as Sets of Propositions  
The foundational work for the semantics of questions was laid by Hamblin (1958, 
1973), who was the first to postulate that a question denotes its answer. Hamblin 
viewed a question as denoting the set of alternatives that could count as answering 
the question. Karttunen (1977) builds on Hamblin’s proposal by considering 
embedded questions. Based on the properties of some embedding verbs, such as 
know, tell, find out, he concludes that the meaning of an interrogative expression 
is not those propositions that count as possible answers, but only those which 
count as true answers. Thus the question Who likes Bill? denotes all the propositions 
containing individuals such that the property LIKES(x, b) is true of those individuals.  
 It is notable that the answer set consists of only those propositions, which 
include individuals of whom it is true in a world that they like Bill. The intuition 
is that when someone asks Who likes Bill? one is asking for only those answers, 
which include the individuals of whom the property of liking Bill is actually true 
in order to resolve the question. This contrasts with Hamblin’s view in that there 
it does not matter whether individuals actually liked Bill.  
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 One crucial feature of Karttunen’s proposal is that a question denotes a set of 
propositions and is of type <s, <<s,t>, t >> as its sense is a function from worlds to 
sets of propositions. Thus the exhaustive answer to a question like Who likes Bill? 
is the conjunction of all the true instantiations of  LIKES(x, b). What is crucial here 
with regard to mutually exclusive alternatives is that the propositions in the answer 
space are not mutually exclusive with respect to other propositions that are true in 
that world of evaluation, but only with respect to other worlds of evaluation. 
 
1.2.  Questions as Partitions of Logical Space 
Groenendijk and Stokhof (1982) appeal to the intuition that questions split up the 
logical space into different ways the world could be. In this respect, their analysis 
is more closely related to that of Hamblin (1958) who shared this intuition. More 
specifically Groenendijk and Stokhof explore in more detail Karttunen’s notion of 
the exhaustive answer. They notice for example that knowing the answer to the 
question Who likes Bill? is not only knowing which individuals like Bill, but also 
which individuals do not. Thus they term Karttunen’s view of answerhood as 
weakly exhaustive, and their own as strongly exhaustive.  
 Since strong exhaustivity does not follow from Karttunen’s proposal, their 
analysis makes use of the intuition already familiar from Hamblin, that questions 
divide the logical space into partitions of possible worlds. For example, the question 
Who likes Bill? might partition the possible worlds into five compartments, in each 
of which one of these possible answers is true: ‘Only Annie likes Bill,’ ‘Annie and 
Susan like Bill,’ ‘nobody likes Bill,’ ‘everybody likes Bill,’ and ‘Bill is the only one 
who likes Bill.’ Knowing that one of these propositions is the true one thus entails 
knowing that the other four are false. In this view, a question is thus a function from 
worlds to propositions, of type <s, <s,t>> and a question denotes a single proposi-
tion that counts as its true and complete answer. Since a question denotes only one 
single proposition, this proposition is mutually exclusive with any other proposition 
since it is the only one that answers the question in a given world of evaluation.  
Though both types of theories agree that a question denotes its true and com-
plete answer, they do make different predictions concerning what precisely makes 
an answer complete. These differing predictions hinge on the two conceptions of 
the answer space with a set of non-mutually exclusive propositions on the one 
hand, and a single proposition which is mutually exclusive with respect to all 
other alternatives on the other hand.  As we shall see in the next section, open 
questions present a challenge to both of these views.  
 
2.  Properties of Open Questions 
Open questions appear at first glance to pose a problem to the semantic theories 
outlined above, as answers to these questions are agent-relative (to borrow a term 
from Ginzburg 1997), not exhaustive, and the propositions in the answer space are 
not mutually exclusive with respect to other propositions.  
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2.1. Agent-Relativity 
One important property of open questions is that their answers are relative to the 
beliefs, or epistemic state of the speaker. Consider the following exchange taking 
place on a news show between the anchor Tom, and his guests Dick and Harry.  
 
(3)  Tom:  What effects will the stimulus have on the economy? 
 Dick:  It’ll avert disaster, putting people to work doing jobs that needed to 
be done anyway. 
 Harry: Oh forget it. All it will do is drive the economy into the ground for 
good.  
 
In this exchange Dick and Harry express opposite points of view on an issue, but 
neither one of them could be said to be right or wrong, at least not at speech time. 
It may turn out at some later point that Dick or Harry will be proven wrong, but at 
the time of speech the speakers do not have access to this knowledge and answer 
based on what they know about the issue and their beliefs. In short, the answer to 
this question, and other open questions like it, is relative to each individual’s 
epistemic state, and not objective knowledge about the world.  
 This kind of relativity is reminiscent of what Lasersohn (2005, 2007) calls 
faultless disagreement, since despite the fact that the two propositions openly 
contradict each other, neither one can be said to be true or false. Though the kind 
of relativism found here is not exactly like faultless disagreement since disagree-
ments about mistaken beliefs give rise to at fault disagreement according to this 
account, it is clear that speakers answering open questions are relativizing responses 
to their beliefs or knowledge state, rather than speaking objectively about the world.  
 
2.2.  The Answer Space 
The two views on the semantics of questions paint different pictures concerning the 
organization of the answer space. On Karttunen’s view, the answer space is made up 
of a set of propositions that jointly provide the exhaustive answer to a question. Thus, 
propositions within the answer space are mutually compatible. On the Groenendijk 
and Stokhof view, a singe proposition makes up one partition of the logical space, 
and that proposition is mutually exclusive with respect to all other possibilities.  
 Answers to open questions support the Karttunen view of the answer space, since 
answers are mutually compatible with a host of other propositions. Consider (4):  
 
(4)  Sally:  What is Chicago like? 
 Mary:  It’s great. There’s so much to do here, and the people are really nice.  
 
If Mary’s response were a partition of logical space corresponding to the true and 
complete answer to Sally’s question, we would expect it to rule out all other 
possibilities. This prediction, however, does not appear to be borne out as her 
response is compatible with many other propositions, such as ‘it’s really cold in 
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the winter,’ or ‘Chicago is the third largest city in the world,’ assuming these are 
both true statements about what Chicago is like.  
 The question of how the answer space is organized ties in directly with the question 
of what “exhaustive” means for the two theories of interrogatives in question. 
 
2.3. Exhaustivity 
Both the partitions of logical space view (Groenendijk and Stokhof 1982, 1984) 
and the sets of propositions view (Karttunen 1977) face a challenge with open 
questions since answers to these kinds of questions do not appear to be exhaustive 
in any relevant sense. Consider for example an answer to (1a) repeated here in (5) 
in a context where Ralph just got dumped and Susie is his best friend.  
 
(5)  Susie:  How do you feel? 
 Ralph:  # I feel rejected and lonely because my girlfriend left me, I have 
an ingrown toe-nail which is hurting my big toe, I feel a migraine 
coming on because I ate too much chocolate, I am nervous about 
my presentation, I have an itch on my arm...  
 Ralphƍ: I feel rejected and alone.  
 
It is clear that Ralph’s second answer is the more felicitous one, even if all the 
statements he makes about how he feels in the first scenario are true. Indeed one 
may argue that an embedded question like (6) should always be false under 
traditional analyses of questions.  
 
(6)  I know how you feel.  
 
Very intuitively, this sentence means, “I know how you feel regarding such and 
such.” What it does not mean is “I know the exhaustive set of propositions that 
correspond to how you feel.” Answers to open questions are thus not exhaustive in 
the traditional sense of listing all the propositions that truthfully answer the question, 
but rather they are exhaustive only with respect to some relevant context or scenario.  
 
2.4.  To-do List 
To sum up this section, we have seen that open questions present a challenge to 
existing theories of interrogatives, as answers to this type of question are agent 
relative rather than objectively true or false, as well as not exhaustive in the 
traditional sense, but rather exhaustive with respect to the relevant issue. Further 
we have seen that data from open questions support Karttunen’s view of the 
answer space, i.e. that it is a set of propositions as opposed to a single proposition.  
 An analysis of open questions should capture their particular properties, and in 
addition maintain the basic intuition behind the semantics of questions, which is 
that questions denote their true and complete answer. 
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3. Towards a Meaning for Open Questions 
In this section I present such an analysis that draws on insights from modal semantics 
(Kratzer 1977, 1981), making it possible to account for the facts with only a slight 
modification of Karttunen’s original proposal. The proposed analysis also extends to 
other question types, yielding a unified account of interrogatives. I lay out the formal 
framework in section 3.1. and illustrate how the proposal works concretely on an 
example in section 3.2. Section 3.3. extends the analysis to other question types.  
 
3.1.  Formalizing Open Questions 
This section lays out the formal framework that accounts for the various proper-
ties of open questions discussed above. The main departure from previous treat-
ments of interrogatives (Hamblin 1958, Karttunen 1977, Groenendijk and Stokhof 
1982) is that the propositions in the answer-space will be determined by a certain 
world of evaluation, rather than representing mutually exclusive alternatives. In 
order to get an ordering on the propositions that are possible answers, we can 
follow the semantics for modals presented by Kratzer (1977, 1981) for epistemic 
modals, and the semantics for imperatives and root modals presented by Portner 
(2007). The propositions that are true in the worlds that are BEST-ranked with 
respect to an epistemic modal base, and contextually determined ordering source 
are propositions that are resolving for a given question.  
 
3.1.1.  The Modal Base  
I take an open question to denote a set of propositions and follow Karttunen 
(1977) in postulating that the answer space is defined by all the true propositions 
that can count as answering the question, rather than all the possible ones (Ham-
blin 1958). Karttunen’s denotation for what he called a proto-question is given 
below - it is our point of departure:  
 
(7) [[?ĳ]]w1 = Ȝp(p = Ȝw[ĳ(w)]) p(w1)  
 
That is, at a world, a question asks for a set of propositions that answers ĳ and is 
true in that world. In this section I show that by fixing the worlds of evaluation, 
we can leave Karttunen’s analysis of interrogatives intact, while accounting for 
the full range of open questions data. Thus, in modal terms, the answer space is 
comprised of the set of propositions compatible with an epistemic modal base that 
contains all the propositions compatible with what the speaker knows. This is 
intuitively clear since it is reasonable to assume that a speaker asks an interlocutor 
a question because he thinks the interlocutor knows the answer. Thus, in a context 
c, an epistemic conversational background cb limits the worlds of evaluation to the 
ones accessible from what a speaker knows in w, such that f(w) represents a set of 
facts known by the speaker in w, and the set of worlds accessible from w is ŀf(w).  
 
(8)   a. A conversational background cb is a function form worlds to sets of 
propositions (Kratzer 1977, 1981)  
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   b. Epistemic cb function f: For any world w in the domain of f, f(w) = 
   {p: the speaker of c knows p in w.}  
 
As I pointed out in section 2.1., the answers to open questions are true only relative 
to an individual, so we can relativize the truth of these propositions to each individ-
ual using an individual anchor (Farkas 1992). Applying an individual anchor to an 
epistemic modal base thus relativizes the accessible worlds to an individual:  
 
(9)   epistemicx(w) = {p: x takes p to be true in w}  
 
The intersection of all the propositions compatible with the speaker’s knowledge 
ŀf(w), is a set of worlds, the epistemic modal base. By anchoring an epistemic 
conversational background to any individual x, we can account for the truth-
relativity of speakers (Farkas 1992). Truth is thus defined as follows:  
 
(10)   For any proposition p, context c and conversational background function 
  f : p is true in w iff w  [[p]]c,f. 
 
In other words, a proposition is true in any given world, if that world is a member 
of the modal base, the intersection of all the propositions compatible with an 
individual’s epistemic state (ŀf(w)). Now we are in a position to consolidate the 
fact that to interlocutors may have conflicting opinions about any given question 
with Karttunen’s intuition that a question denotes a set of true propositions. 
However, the modal base may still be compatible with some propositions that are 
not acceptable answers to a question. In order to narrow down the propositions 
that can count as “good” answers, we can further restrict which worlds are acces-
sible for the evaluation of the question. This is done by applying a second cb 
function, an ordering source on the modal base.  
 
3.1.2. Setting the Worlds of Evaluation  
Ordering sources are also functions from worlds to sets of propositions, and can in 
principle be any of the following:  
 
(11)  a. teleologicalx(w) = {p: p expresses a belief of x in w}  
 b. deonticx(w) = {p: p expresses a an obligation of x in w}  
 c. epistemicx(w) = {p: p expresses knowledge of x in w}  
 d. bouleticx(w) = {p: p expresses a desire of x in w}  
 e. circumstantialx(w) = {p: p expresses a set of circumstances holding for 
x in w} 
 f. stereotypicalx(w) = {p: p expresses an expectation on the part of x 
concerning what w is like}  
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g(w) is a set of propositions used an ordering source on the modal base. Thus the 
BEST-ranked worlds are those worlds from the modal base in which all of g(w) are 
true. g(w) does the ordering:  
 
(12)   For any set of propositions g(w) and any worlds w, v in the modal base:  
  w g(w) v iff for all p  g(w), if v  p, then w  p.  
 
This definition says that ranking w higher or equal with respect to v means that 
any proposition in g(w) that is true in v is also true in w. The worlds that come out 
BEST according to this ranking are the accessible ones. Using a ranking of worlds 
in a modal base according to a contextually determined ordering source thus fixes 
the worlds of evaluation for open questions. Now we can express the meaning of 
an open question as in (14), where BEST is defined as in (13).  
 
(13)   BESTw = {v |v  ŀf(w) and there is no vƍ  ŀf(w) such that vƍ g(w) v}.  
(14)  [[?ĳ]]w,c,f,g =  Ȝp.p = Ȝwƍ. ĳ(wƍ)  wƍƍ   BESTf(w).p(wƍƍ) 
 
This denotation says that an interrogative expression is evaluated with respect to a 
world, w, context c and two conversational background functions, f, and g. A 
question “?ĳ” thus asks for a set of propositions, such that the propositions are of 
the form ĳ and those propositions must true in all of the BEST-ranked worlds. As a 
result only those propositions that are true in all the BEST-ranked worlds are the 
actual answers, i.e. the propositions in the answer space. Another way of thinking 
about this is that all the BEST-ranked worlds have to be part of the denotation of any 
proposition that counts as the answer. This definition departs from that of Karttunen 
(1977) only in that the set of propositions that are true are restricted to the ones that 
are true in the BEST worlds according to the relevant conversational backgrounds.  
  
3.2.  How it Works 
In this section I show how the proposed analysis achieves the desired result of 
relativizing truth to individual epistemic states, and exhaustivity to a specific 
context, while maintaining a standard denotation for questions. Consider once 
again our first question, given below, in two different contexts.  
 
(15)  [[How do you feel?]]w,c,f,g = Ȝp.p = Ȝwƍ[f .you feel f in wƍ]   
 wƍƍ  BESTf(w).p(wƍƍ) 
 
3.2.1.  Context 1 
In this context Susie and Ralph are best friends, and Ralph’s girlfriend just left 
him. The two relevant cb functions are the following:  
 
(16) f = Epistemic  
 g = Circumstantial  
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Thus the modal base is a set of worlds comprised of the intersection of all the proposi-
tions compatible with Ralph’s beliefs, and the ordering source is a set of propositions.  
 
(17) Modal base:  
 ŀfRalph(w) = Set of worlds compatible with Ralph’s beliefs.  
 Ordering source:  
 g(w) = {‘My girlfriend just broke up with me,’ ‘She left me for another guy.’}  
 
Recall the set of propositions that are true answers with respect to Ralph’s beliefs 
from (5). We want to be able to get to the actual answer, which is I feel rejected 
and alone while at the same time eliminating such true but irrelevant statements 
as My foot hurts because I have an in-grown toenail.  
 To accomplish this end, the worlds in the modal base are ordered according to 
how may of the propositions in the ordering source are true in them and the 
(exhaustive) answer is made up all of propositions that answer the question and 
are true in the BEST-ranked worlds. Applying the ordering source to the epistemic 
modal base rules out statements about in-grown toenails and the like for the 
following reasons. The first concerns the ordering source; there are some worlds 
where Ralph has an in-grown toenail, and others where he does not, but the only 
thing all the BEST-ranked worlds have in common is that the set of circumstances 
in g(w) hold. The second reason concerns universal quantification over BEST-
ranked worlds; since the propositions that count as answers have to be true in all 
of the BEST-ranked worlds, propositions about toenails will be ruled out, as these 
are true in only some of the BEST-ranked worlds, but not all.  
 
3.2.2.  Context 2 
In this context Ralph was still just broken up with but now Susie and Ralph are at 
the LSA where Ralph is about to give his first conference presentation. The cb 
functions are the same as before, with an epistemic modal base and circumstantial 
ordering source, but now Ralph considers different propositions to include in his 
ordering source.  
 
(18) Modal base:  
 ŀfRalph(w) = Set of worlds compatible with Ralph’s beliefs.  
 Ordering source:  
 g(w) = {‘I am about to give my first conference presentation,’ ‘Famous 
people are here,’ ‘My advisor is watching to see how I’ll do.’}  
 
In this scenario, though he is still feeling lonely and rejected, answering so would 
not be felicitous given the circumstances. We might say that Susie is really asking 
How do you feel in view of your impending presentation? as opposed to How do 
you feel in view of having been dumped? as before. In this case the actual answer 
would be, I feel a little nervous. Furthermore, other true but irrelevant proposi-
tions would be ruled out as before since they may be true in all the worlds in the 
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epistemic modal base, but not all the BEST-ranked worlds according to this 
particular ordering source.  
 
3.3.  Extensions 
The analysis presented above is straightforwardly extendable to other question 
types. In this section I show how the analysis can account for simple informative 
questions as well as mention-some questions, which have posed a problem to 
previous accounts of questions.  
  
3.3.1.  Informative Questions 
Concerning informative like (19) are the basic case in the semantic literature on 
interrogatives.  
 
(19)  Who went to BLS this year? 
 
There is a strong intuition here that the exhaustive answer to such a question 
would have to include all the individuals of whom it is true that they went to BLS 
last year. We can achieve just that using a modal approach by simply saying that 
the ordering source is simply empty in the case of informative questions, demand-
ing the addressee to name all those individuals who came to BLS, as compatible 
with her epistemic state.  
 
3.3.2.  Mention-Some Questions 
Mention-some questions, as the one below, have been problematic for theories 
subscribing to view that questions denote their true and exhaustive answer.  
 
(20)  Where can I buy a newspaper? 
 
Questions such as this one are viewed as problematic, because they very intui-
tively do not ask for a complete list of places where you could buy a newspaper, 
but ones that are close by, or easily reachable. However, it is not necessary to 
resort to principles of pragmatic reasoning to capture this specific interpretation. 
A modal analysis allows a fully semantic explanation through the application of a 
circumstantial ordering source on the worlds compatible with the addressee’s 
epistemic state to give us the correct outcome. The question will limit the accessi-
ble worlds to ones that are specified for a particular geographic location, requiring 
an exhaustive answer with respect to those worlds only. 
In this respect open questions and mention-some questions are different from 
informative questions as these require a contextually determined ordering source 
to get the right denotation.  
 
4.  Conclusions and Direction for Future Research 
In this paper I have argued that the semantic accounts of interrogatives account 
for only a small sample of the natural language data from interrogative expres-
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sions. The main goal of the paper has been to present an analysis of questions that 
takes the seemingly most deviant data as basic and accounts for the standard 
interrogative types by extension. After reviewing the shortcomings of previous 
analyses in light of data from open questions, I presented an analysis in the frame-
work of modal semantics that draws on insights from the literature on truth-relativity.  
Specifically, I have shown that interrogatives, like modal expressions, rely on 
the context as part of their semantic meaning. Like a modal, a question is thus 
evaluated with respect to a context, a modal base, and an ordering source, which 
determine for each individual, and each context the denotation of the question. 
In sum, I have argued for a meaning of interrogatives that is not very different 
from what Karttunen (1977) proposed. A question still denotes its true answer, 
only the truth of the answer hinges on the epistemic state of the individual ques-
tioned rather than the state of the world; and a question still denotes its exhaustive 
answer, only the answer is exhaustive with respect to the BEST-ranked worlds 
according to a contextually determined ordering source.  
The analysis presented here raises a number of important questions for future 
research. The first concerns the structure of the discourse and the pragmatics 
involved in evaluating different question types. In the account I presented here, 
the pragmatics are directly ‘built-in’ to the semantics, as the pragmatics is respon-
sible for selecting the relevant ordering source in a given context. In addition to 
integrating the pragmatics into the truth-conditional meaning of a question, the 
discourse plays an important role. It might be, for example, that the modal base is 
not an individual’s belief worlds, but rather the intersection of all the propositions 
that make up the common ground (CG) (Stalnaker 1974, 1978). Outlining a model 
of questions that takes principles of pragmatics and the discourse into account in 
order to arrive at a meaning is thus one avenue for further inquiry.  
Another question raised by the analysis concerns the difference between open 
questions and other kinds of questions with respect to truth-relativity. I have 
presented a view in which expressions are evaluated with respect to individual 
epistemic states rather than the tangible world. The obvious question is thus why 
the truth conditions of open questions should hinge on individual epistemic states 
while it appears that we use our knowledge about the world to evaluate expres-
sions otherwise. This particular question is an extremely rich area of inquiry that I 
hope to be able to address in future work.  
 The study of open questions has thus led to a semantic account of interroga-
tives that is able to handle a range of data that was not possible under existing 
semantic proposals. In addition, this rich topic lies at the intersection of a number 
of other avenues of research well worth exploring.  
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